Lesson 7 of 7 · 8 min
Tor: how onion routing works, and what it does not protect
Tor hides who you are from the sites you visit and hides what you visit from your network. Learn how its layers work, who relies on it, its limits, and why some networks treat Tor traffic with suspicion.
Tor, short for “The Onion Router”, is free software and a volunteer-run network that makes it much harder to link what you do online to who you are. It was originally developed from research at the US Naval Research Laboratory and is now maintained by the Tor Project, a non-profit organisation. Journalists, human rights workers, people living under censorship and ordinary privacy-conscious users rely on it every day. Criminals use it too, which is why it has a complicated reputation.
How onion routing works
Normally, when you visit a website, your internet provider can see which site you are contacting, and the site can see your IP address, which points roughly to where you are. Tor breaks that link. The Tor Browser sends your traffic through three volunteer-run relays chosen from thousands around the world, and it wraps the traffic in three layers of encryption, like the layers of an onion.
- The entry (guard) relay knows your IP address but not what you are visiting.
- The middle relay knows neither who you are nor where you are going; it only passes traffic between the other two.
- The exit relay knows the site you are visiting but not who you are.
Each relay removes one layer of encryption, learns only the next hop, and passes the rest along. No single relay knows both who you are and what you are doing. Onion services, the sites with .onion addresses, go one step further: the traffic never leaves the Tor network, so the site’s location is hidden too.
Who uses Tor, and why
- People in countries that censor or monitor the internet, to reach news and communicate.
- Journalists and their sources, including through secure drop systems run by news organisations.
- Activists, researchers and domestic-abuse survivors who need to avoid being tracked.
- Ordinary users who do not want advertisers or their network provider to profile their browsing.
What Tor does not protect
The Tor Project is direct about its limits. Asked whether Tor makes you totally anonymous, its own support pages answer no, and list the ways people give themselves away. Tor protects the route your traffic takes; it cannot protect you from what you reveal yourself.
| Tor helps with | Tor does not help with |
|---|---|
| Hiding your IP address from the sites you visit | Logging into accounts that identify you (your real email or social account) |
| Hiding which sites you visit from your internet provider or local network | Malicious software already on your computer, which can bypass Tor entirely |
| Reaching sites that are censored on your network | Files you download and open outside Tor Browser, which can connect directly and reveal your address |
| Hiding an onion service’s location | Unencrypted traffic at the exit relay: without HTTPS, the exit can read it |
Why some networks treat Tor traffic with suspicion
From the point of view of a website or a company network, all Tor users look the same: traffic arrives from a small set of known exit relays whose addresses the Tor Project publishes in a public list. Because attackers also use Tor to hide where they are, many services add friction for Tor visitors, such as extra verification steps, and many security teams watch for unexpected connections to or from Tor. On a work computer, a program you did not install quietly connecting through Tor can be a sign of malicious software trying to hide where it sends data.
Seeing Tor traffic on your own Mac
FireAI can help you tell the difference between Tor you chose to use and Tor you did not. With its optional threat lists turned on (they are off by default), FireAI downloads the Tor Project’s public exit list. When you investigate a connection, it tells you whether the other end is a Tor exit relay, and it counts that as one of the risk signals it weighs, alongside which app made the connection. If it is Tor Browser, that is expected. If it is an app you do not recognise, you can block it. FireAI does not block Tor on its own, and it does not weaken the anonymity of Tor Browser: the check happens locally on your Mac.
Using Tor safely
- Download Tor Browser only from the Tor Project’s official website, and keep it updated.
- Do not log into accounts that identify you while you need to stay anonymous.
- Do not install extra browser add-ons: they can make your browser stand out or leak information.
- Prefer sites that use HTTPS, so the exit relay cannot read what you send.
- Open downloaded documents only after disconnecting, or in a separate environment: some file types can fetch content from the internet directly, outside Tor.
- If you face serious risks, such as a hostile government, read specialist guidance like the EFF’s Surveillance Self-Defense before relying on any single tool.
Tor, VPNs and proxies
A VPN moves your trust from your internet provider to one VPN company, which can see your traffic and knows who you are. Tor spreads that trust across three independent relays so that no single one sees the whole picture. Tor is slower and some sites block it; a VPN is faster and simpler but requires trusting its operator. The earlier course on how the internet works compares them in more detail.
Key takeaways
- Tor sends traffic through three relays with layered encryption so that no single relay knows both who you are and what you visit.
- It protects the route, not what you reveal: logging into your accounts or opening downloads outside Tor Browser can identify you.
- Malicious software already on your computer can bypass Tor completely.
- Tor exit addresses are public, so networks can recognise Tor traffic; an unknown app using Tor can be a warning sign.
Check yourself
1. In a Tor connection, which relay knows your IP address?
- The exit relay
- The entry (guard) relay — Right.
- The middle relay
- All three relays
Only the entry relay sees your IP address, and it does not know your destination. The exit relay knows the destination but not who you are.
2. Which of these can still identify you even while using Tor Browser?
- Visiting a news site over HTTPS
- Logging into your personal email or social media account — Right.
- Reading a .onion site
- Changing the Tor circuit
Tor hides your network address, but logging into an account tied to your identity tells the site exactly who you are.
3. An app you never installed on purpose is connecting through Tor exit relays. What does that suggest?
- It is definitely a system update
- It may be malicious software hiding where it sends data, and it deserves investigation — Right.
- Tor is broken
- Your Wi-Fi is too slow
Tor use you did not choose is a classic warning sign: attackers use it to hide their servers. Identify the app and block it if you cannot explain it.
Do it with FireAI
Put this lesson into practice on your own Mac.
- Rules: app, website, domain, IP or a range, forever or until you restart — Write a rule as precise as one address or as broad as an entire domain.
- The World map — See where your data actually goes, not just a hostname you’d have to look up yourself.
- Threat lists (opt-in) — Check your traffic against public threat data without sending it anywhere.
- Investigate a connection — Decide with the facts in front of you, not a vague warning.
- Security modes: Home, Coffee shop, Paranoid, Under attack — Match FireAI’s strictness to where your Mac actually is, in one tap.
- USB Network Protection: nothing from a USB drive goes online unasked — Plug in a drive someone handed you without letting what’s on it phone home.
Sources
- Tor Project
- Tor Project Support: Am I totally anonymous if I use Tor?
- Tor Project Support: How is Tor different from other proxies?
- Tor Project: bulk exit node list
- EFF: Surveillance Self-Defense
Put it into practice on your Mac
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